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This paper contributes to the literature on FDI and economic
growth. We deviate from previous studies by introducing measures
of the volatility of FDI inflows. As introduced into the model, these
are predicted to have a negative effect on growth. We estimate the
standard model using cross-section, panel data and instrumental
variable techniques for a sample of 67 developing countries. Whilst
all results are not entirely robust, the consistent finding is that
volatility of FDI has a negative effect on growth. The evidence for
a positive effect of FDI is not robust, nor is that for any effect of
human capital. For the developing countries in the sample, there is
evidence of convergence and the principal factors retarding growth
appear to be policy distortions and the volatility of FDI, interpreted
as a proxy for factors causing economic instability.
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There is now a considerable literature on the impact of foreign direct
investment (FDI) and growth. The contribution of this paper is to take
the effect of volatility of FDI flows on growth into account. Using a
variety of econometric techniques on a sample of developing countries,
we find that the volatility of such flows has a consistent negative effect
on growth. There are a number of reasons why volatility of FDI inflows
may be negatively associated with growth. A first is that volatility itself
has a negative effect on growth. The recent endogenous growth
literature on FDI provides some arguments why this might be so. This
literature shows that FDI positively affects growth by decreasing the
costs of R&D through stimulating innovation. If FDI inflows are
uncertain, costs of R&D are uncertain, which negatively affects
incentives to innovate. While FDI is considered to be less volatile than
otherprivate flows, it is possible that sudden changes in the volume of
FDI inflows can have a destabilising impact on the economy.
A second possibility might be that the volatility of FDI flows is a proxy
for economic or political uncertainty; FDI volatility may reflect
underlying uncertainty (political and economic) in a country. Lensink
and Morrissey (2000) and Guillaumont and Chavet (1999) suggest that
economic uncertainty is an important determinant of both growth and
the productivity of investment in developing countries. By ‘economic
uncertainty’ they refer to the tendency of some developing countries to
be particularly vulnerable to shocks that have the immediate effect of
reducing income and, if recurrent, tend to reduce growth (or constrain
6the ability of an economy to reach its steady state growth rate). These
shocks may be external, such as terms of trade shocks or financial crises
induced by the volatility of capital flows, or ‘acts of nature’, such as
severe drought or floods. Aizenman and Marion (1999) find that
indicators of macroeconomic volatility have a robust, significant and
negative effect of levels of private investment. If we conjecture that FDI
has similar determinants to private investment, then FDI volatility may
be a proxy for growth-retarding instability.
The aim of this paper is to examine the impact of FDI on growth in
developing countries, specifically accounting for volatility. Section 2
briefly reviews some of the relevant existing literature on FDI. Section 3
presents a model incorporating volatility of FDI. The data and measures
used are described in Section 4 and the results are discussed in Section
5. The conclusions are in Section 6.
'341""51/&
The contribution of FDI to economic growth has been debated quite
extensively in the literature. The ‘traditional’ argument is that an inflow
of FDI improves economic growth by increasing the capital stock,
whereas recent literature points to the role of FDI as a channel of
international technology transfer. There is growing evidence that FDI
enhances technological change through technological diffusion, for
example because multinational firms are concentrated in industries with
a high ratio of R&D relative to sales and a large share of technical and
professional workers (Markusen, 1995). Multinational corporations are
probably among the most technologically advanced firms in the world.
Moreover, FDI not only contributes to imports of more efficient foreign
technologies, but also generates technological spillovers for local firms.
In this approach, technological change plays a pivotal role in economic
growth and FDI by multinational corporations is one of the major
channels in providing developing countries (LDCs) with access to
advanced technologies. The knowledge spillovers may take place via
imitation, competition, linkages and/ or training (Kinoshita, 1998;
Sjoholm, 1999). Although it is in practice rather difficult to distinguish
between these four channels, the underlying theory differs.
The  channel is based on the view that domestic firms may
become more productive by imitating the more advanced technologies or
managerial practices of foreign firms (the more so the greater the
technology gap). In the absence of FDI, acquiring the necessary
8information for adopting new technologies is too costly for local firms.
Thus, FDI lowers the cost of technology adoption and may expand the
set of technologies available to local firms. The 
 channel
emphasises that the entrance of foreign firms intensifies competition in
the domestic market, encouraging domestic firms to become more
efficient by upgrading their technology base.
The  channel stresses that foreign firms may transfer new
technology to domestic firms through transactions with these firms. By
purchasing raw materials or intermediate goods a strong buyer-seller
relationship may develop that gives rise to technical assistance or
training from the foreign firm to the domestic firm. Finally, the 	
channel arises if the introduction of new technologies requires an
upgrading of domestically available human capital. New technologies
can only be adopted when the labour force is able to work with them.
The entrance of foreign firms may give an incentive to domestic firms to
train their own employees. If labour moves from a multinational to a
local firm (through labour turnover), the physical movement of workers
causes knowledge to move between firms.
Empirical evidence that FDI generates positive spillovers for local firms
is mixed (see Saggi, 2000, for a survey). Some studies find positive
spillover effects, some find no effects and some even conclude that there
are negative effects (on the latter see Aitken and Harrison, 1999). This
does not necessarily imply that FDI is not beneficial for growth (for a
survey of FDI and growth in LDCs, see De Mello and Luiz. 1997). It
may be that the spillovers are of a different nature. Aitken  (1997),
9for instance, point to the importance of the entry of multinationals for
reducing entry costs of other potential exporters. Moreover, FDI may
also contribute to growth by means of an increase in capital flows and
the capital stock.
Some recent studies have argued that the contribution of FDI to growth
is strongly dependent on the circumstances in recipient countries.
Balasubramanyam  (1996) find that the effect on growth is stronger
in countries with a policy of export promotion than in countries that
pursue a policy of import substitution. In a very influential paper,
Borensztein l (1998) suggest that the effectiveness of FDI depends
on the stock of human capital in the host country. Only in countries




Most theoretical analysis of the relationship between uncertainty and
investment is based on how the expected marginal revenue product of
capital is affected by the uncertain variable. Under the assumptions of
risk neutrality and a convex profit function, Jensen’s inequality ensures
that the effect of uncertainty on investment is positive (Hartman, 1972);
if one introduces risk aversion the sign on the effect is ambiguous
(Zeira, 1987). Caballero (1991) derives a negative effect of uncertainty
on investment by introducing imperfect competition and/or decreasing
returns to scale. Aizenman and Marion (1999) show that under
generalized expected utility (disappointment aversion) and/or market
imperfections, one can derive a negative link between investment and
10
volatility. However, there is no general theoretical prediction on the sign
of the relationship.
Where the issue is addressed, empirical studies consistently find a
negative effect of uncertainty (measured in various ways) on investment.
Serven (1998) uses seven measures of uncertainty for five variables
(such as growth, terms of trade) and finds evidence for all having a
negative impact on levels of private investment for a large sample of
developing countries. Aizenman and Marion (1999) use four measures
of volatility (government spending, money growth, real exchange rate
and an index of all three) and also find a significant, negative impact on
private investment for a sample of developing countries. Interestingly,
volatility has no significant effect on total investment, and is
significantly negatively related to public investment, according to their
results. One implication is that if macroeconomic volatility has an
adverse impact on growth via its effect on investment this must be
through the effect on private investment (in this scenario, it is implied
that private investment is more productive, in terms of enhancing
growth, than public investment). Thus, volatility of private investment
(or FDI in our case) may have a negative impact on growth.
A number of recent papers have begun to address aspects of risk and
vulnerability in the context of the aid-growth relationship (and we note
that investment is the principal mechanism through which aid enhances
growth). Lensink and Morrissey (2000) argue that aid instability,
measured as a residual of an autoregressive trend estimate of aid
receipts, can proxy for two forms of uncertainty that may be growth-
11
reducing. First is recipient uncertainty regarding future aid receipts,
which may have adverse effects on investment.  Second, is economic
uncertainty, as the incidence of shocks will tend to attract unanticipated
aid, hence increase measured instability of aid flows. Lensink and
Morrissey (2000) find that the coefficient on the aid instability measure
is negative and significant and infer that economic uncertainty is
growth-retarding. Guillaumont and Chauvet (1999) address the
implications of including a measure of the ‘vulnerability’ of the
economic environment (or economic uncertainty) in an aid-growth
regression. They find that growth is lower in more vulnerable
economies, i.e. where macroeconomic volatility is greater. Dehn and
Gilbert (1999) look specifically at instability of commodity prices and
find evidence that vulnerability to commodity price variability reduces
growth, although much depends on how governments respond. Thus, in
addition to the potential direct negative effect on growth, volatility of
FDI may also proxy for other factors that retard growth.

*3/2!65
In this section we present a simple endogenous growth model in which
FDI has a positive effect on growth, whereas the volatility in FDI flows
has a negative effect. In the model FDI, as well as the volatility in FDI,
affects growth via the cost of innovation. The model is in line with the
recent theories emphasising the importance of FDI in enhancing
technological change through technological diffusion. This model
provides an illustrative framework, which explains a possible channel by
which the volatility in FDI flows negatively affect growth.
Using the framework of the technological change models (see chapters 6
and 7 of Barro and Sala-I-Martin, 1995) it is possible to present a formal
model which shows how FDI may increase growth. We use a model with
an expanding variety of products, adapted from Barro and Sala-i-Martin
(1995, chapter 6) and following Borensztein  (1998), so that we can
be brief about its structure.2
The model assumes that technical progress is represented through the
variety of capital goods available. There are three types of agents in the
model: final goods producers, innovators and consumers. Each final
goods’ producer rents  varieties of capital good from specialised firms
that produce a type of capital good (the innovators). The producer has
monopoly rights over the production and sale of the capital goods. The
                                                          
2
 A more complete derivation of the model and a comparison of our results (for a
sample including developed countries) with those of Borensztein HWDO (1998) can
be found in Lensink and Morrissey (2001).
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purchase price  M of the capital good is set by optimising the present
value of the returns from inventing (and producing in several periods),
!". This leads to a fixed mark-up over production costs. Barro and
Sala-I-Martin (1995: 218), assuming free entry of inventors, show that in
equilibrium with positive R&D (at cost η) and increasing , the
(constant) rate of return (interest rate, 	) is given by:
)1/(2)1/(1 )1()/1( αα α
α
αη −− −= /$U (1)
where α measures capital’s share of income (coefficient in Cobb-
Douglas production function) and # is labour input.
We can now introduce FDI. The costs of production contain two parts.
Each period there are fixed maintenance costs, assumed equal to 1. In
addition there are fixed set up costs (R&D costs, η)$ The costs of
discovering a new variety of a good (costs of innovation) are assumed to
be the same for all goods. Moreover, assume that the costs of
discovering new goods depend on the ratio of goods produced in other
countries to those produced domestically. This ratio is a proxy for FDI.
A higher ratio of goods produced in other countries, and so more FDI,
would lead to a decline in the costs of innovation. This reflects the idea
that it is cheaper to imitate than to innovate (Borensztein , 1998),
and that the possibility to imitate increases if more goods are produced
in other countries (i.e. when FDI is higher). The costs of discovering a
new good can be modelled as (using FDI = %): η&'!%" where ∂η/∂%< 0
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To account for uncertainty with respect to %, we assume that % is
stochastic, and modelled as %= µ!%"+ε, where µ!%" is the mean of FDI
and ε is an error term with ε~N(0, ε2). The certainty equivalent of the
expected value of FDI is given by !%"&µ!%"()$*σ!%"where  is the
coefficient of absolute risk aversion ( is positive for risk-averse
innovators) and σ!%" refers to the variance in FDI inflows. Taking into
account the certainty equivalent value of FDI, and assuming that the rate

















Equation (2) shows that an increase in FDI leads to an increase in 	
(remember '′(%)<0) whereas an increase in the variance of FDI leads to
a decrease in 	$ To introduce the link to economic growth we close the
model by considering behaviour of households. Households maximise a
standard inter-temporal utility function, subject to the budget constraint.
This gives the well-known Euler condition for the growth rate of
consumption, & = (1/θ)(	 - ρ), where -θ is the elasticity of marginal
utility and ρ is the discount rate. In the steady state the growth rate of
consumption equals the growth rate of output, .














It is now easy to see that an increase in FDI leads to an increase in the
growth rate of output (). An increase in FDI lowers set-up costs (for
technology adaptation) and raises the return on assets (	). This leads to
an increase in saving and so a higher growth rate in consumption and
output. However, an increase in the volatility of FDI negatively affects
growth as it decreases the certainty equivalent value of FDI and
consequently increases set-up costs and decreases the rate of return on
assets.
73 #&12$
In this paper we use World Bank data on the FDI/GDP ratio (+%in
percentages), as this provides wide coverage for a reasonably long
period (1975-97). More importantly, for our purposes, the +% data is
annual (this is essential to calculate volatility). We have observations for
a total of 67 developing countries (not all countries are used in all
regressions). We use the average value of +% for the 1975-1998
period in the cross-section estimates and average values for the sub-
periods in the panel estimates.
For our cross-section estimates volatility of +% (+%) is measured
by taking the standard deviation of errors from the autoregressive
equation for +% with lagged values (three years) and a time trend.
This equation is estimated for all countries over the 1975-1997 period.
This is, admittedly, only an approximate measure of volatility, although
it is standard in the literature (see Lensink and Morrissey, 2000). Given
that the time series available are rather brief, more sophisticated
measures of volatility are not justified. We also use a relative measure of
volatility (,- = +%/+%). For our panel estimates the
volatility in FDI is estimated similarly. However, in order to have
enough degrees of freedom we do not take into account the second and
third order autoregressive terms in the autoregressive equation for
+%. We estimate this equation for all countries, as well as all sub-
periods, distinguished in the panel estimates.
18
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*52 /1*'33& /16(& *)', 5$7,2
Mean 1.000 7.219 2.537 0.813 0.559
Median 0.896 7.202 2.565 0.498 0.465
Maximum 6.364 8.967 4.127 0.498 0.465
Minimum -3.701 5.832 0 0.008 0.177
Std. Dev 1.892 0.748 0.990 1.035 0.348
Skewness 0.184 0.352 -0.559 2.672 2.193
Kurtosis 3.471 2.599 2.748 10.748 9.160
Observations 67 67 67 67 67
1RWH: statistics are based on averages used in cross-section estimates. They
refer to statistics with common samples.
The dependent variable in the basic cross-section regressions is the per
capita growth rate of GDP over the 1970-1998 period (+-). In the
panel estimates we distinguish three periods: 1970-1980; 1980-1990 and
1990-1998. Per capita growth rates are calculated for these sub-periods.
Following the empirical growth literature, a number of ‘standard’
explanatory variables are included in addition to the FDI variables. The
most important of these are the initial values of GDP per capita
(#+  .) and the secondary school enrolment rate (#.), both
measured in logs (for 1970 in the cross-section estimates and for 1970;
1980 and 1990 in the panel estimates). Other variables are the black
market premium (/ ) and government consumption expenditure as a
share of GDP (+-). A range of political and institutional indicators are
also used in estimating the instruments equations; these are discussed
19
below when introduced. Definitions and sources for all variables are
provided in Appendix A. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the
main variables used in the analysis and Table 2 gives a correlation
matrix.
!'0!#8-2
*52 /1*'33& /16(& *)', 5$7,2
*52 1.000
/1*'33& -0.047 1.000
/16(& 0.399 0.659 1.000
*)', 0.033 0.348 0.121 1.000
5$7,2 -0.244 0.050 0.143 0.147 1.000
1RWH: As for Table 1.

,3262&!
We begin with a simple OLS growth regression including foreign direct
investment. We use a linear version of the equation derived in Section 3







As indicated in Section 4, FDI is as a ratio of GDP, two measures of
volatility are used, 1 is the measure of human capital and 2 is initial
income. Where appropriate, other control variables are included in the
regression, as indicated in the tables of results.
Table 3 shows that FDI has a positive effect on growth, although this
result is not robust and only weakly significant, whereas volatility of FDI
has a negative effect, as predicted. The latter holds both for +% and
,- (this relative measure is the preferred indicator of volatility as
+% is highly correlated with FDI) and is consistently significant.
The coefficient on initial GDP is negative and significant, suggesting
convergence, while that on initial education is positive and significant.
The main results are robust to including /  and +-$  The













































































































R2 (adjusted) 0.41 0.49 0.44 0.45 0.47 0.47
F 8.88 10.15 8.56 7.62 8.41 6.92
N 68 68 67 67 67 67
1RWHV: Estimates are simple OLS; W-statistics in parenthesis based on White
Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors. Only significant region
dummies are included – former communist economies (ECA), Latin America
and Caribbean (LAC) and sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).
Borensztein  (1998) argue that human capital (an educated labour
force) is necessary for new technology and management skills to be
absorbed. They include the interactive term %$1 to capture this effect.
They find that the coefficient on FDI is negative (when significant) but
the coefficient on the interaction term (%$1) is positive and
consistently significant. This is interpreted as implying that FDI has a
23
positive impact on growth but this is only realised when 1 is above
some critical level (estimated as 0.52); at low levels of 1 FDI has a
negative impact on growth. The last column in Table 3 presents an
estimate in which we take the interaction of FDI and our schooling
variable into account. It appears that our basic result still holds: FDI has
a positive effect on growth and the volatility in FDI has a negative
effect. However, the interaction term between schooling and FDI is
insignificant.3 Lensink and Morrissey (2001) present results for the same
regression but with a sample also including some 20 developing
countries. The coefficient on +% is robustly positive and significant,
while the regional dummies are more significant. Otherwise the results
are unaltered.
 
A major drawback of the cross-section estimates in Table 3 is that time
series properties are not taken into account; they should be interpreted as
representing aggregate correlations over the long period. We therefore
run regressions for a panel in which three, roughly 10-year, periods are
considered (1970-1980; 1980-1990; 1990-1998). Using panel estimates,
we are able to address fixed effects, an important omitted variable in
cross-country growth regressions. Table 4 presents the results.
The results concerning the volatility of FDI are consistent with the cross-
country estimates: volatility negatively affects growth and the
                                                          
3
 Lensink and Morrissey (2001) present a variety of attempts to estimate the
Borensztein HWDO (1998) model, using the same variables as they employ but not
with an identical sample. They fail to find a significant coefficient on the
interactive term.
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significance is robust. However, the coefficients of +% and human
capital are not robust and mostly insignificant. There is no evidence that
+% determines growth, in contrast to Lensink and Morrissey (2001)
who find the coefficient to be positive and significant when developed
countries are included. On the two occasions when the coefficient on
schooling is significant, the sign is negative. The reason might be that
there simply is not enough variation in #. over periods in the
panel and that the variable behaves like a fixed effect (especially as
initial period GDP is included).
!70	 5/0!9

























































R2 (adjusted) 0.51 0.49 0.47 0.53 0.47 0.56
F 161.62 88.40 78.15 66.17 58.28 48.11
N 224 183 166 159 165 158
1RWHV: t-values in parenthesis are based on White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent
Standard Errors. All estimates incorporate fixed effects.
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The interesting results are in column 6. We obtain a result partly in line
with Borensztein  (1998) as the interactive term is significant and
positive and the coefficient on +% is negative, but not significant.
However, the coefficient on schooling is significant and negative. Note
that the volatility in FDI is still significantly negative, although FDI is no
longer significant. The reason might be that due to including the
interactive term a lot of multicollinearity enters the model, making the
independent FDI variable insignificant. Consequently, we should not
draw strong conclusions from theses results. The suggestion is that
developing countries require both human capital and FDI together if
either is to contribute to growth. It is worth remarking that column 6
does not represent an improvement over the regression in column 4.
Taking the latter as the preferred regression, we could conclude that
there appears to be convergence (or slowing down of growth) among
developing countries and neither human capital nor FDI have
contributed to growth. The principal factors we identify as retarding
growth in developing countries are /  (a measure of policy
distortions) and the volatility of FDI. The latter can be interpreted as a
proxy for factors causing economic instability.

			3
A potential problem with the estimates presented above is that FDI is in
principle endogenous. This implies that OLS regressions are biased. The
technique of instrumental variable (IV) estimation can be used to
address this problem. The issue then is to find instruments for +%and
volatility variables$ We note that the IV technique introduces problems
of its own. In particular, it is difficult to find instruments that are both
26
good at predicting the variable of concern (FDI and its volatility) yet are
not determinants of the dependent variable. Furthermore, and
consequently, IV estimates tend not to be robust to choice of
instruments.
There is a recent literature from proponents of a so-called ‘legal based
view’ that may be helpful in deciding which instruments can be used.
These writers point to the importance of establishing a legal
environment in which financial markets can develop effectively (La
Porta  $ 1997; Levine 1997; Levine   1999). The legal system
determines the overall level and quality of financial services and hence
improves the efficient allocation of resources and economic growth.
Indirectly, the legal system is probably also important in explaining FDI
inflows as better legal systems may improve protection of foreign
investors. Similarly, the nature of the regulatory environment may also
be an important determinant of the attractiveness of a country to foreign
investors.
Following this literature, we consider as instruments indicators of the
legal system and the regulatory environment. Six indicators for the
regulatory environment or ‘governance’ are explored in Lensink and
Morrissey (2001). Here we use only one of these -  +%, is an
indicator that measures perceptions of corruption, interpreted as the
exercise of public power for private gain. This would be expected to be
relevant to investment in developing countries, and performs reasonably
well in Lensink and Morrissey (2001). The limited availability of such
27
data implies that the IV estimates can only be conducted for the cross-
section.
!,0	 5/0'9







































































R2 (adjusted) 0.38 0.28 0.48 0.36 0.48 0.07
F 7.55 5.28 7.33 4.52 10.40 2.92
N 62 56 57 56 56 56
1RWHV: Instrument list: (1) /1*'33&/16(&*)',*5$)7 and a constant.
(2) same as (1) but includes 8*'),*)',. (3), same as (1) but includes
8*)',. (4) same as (2) but includes %03. (5) same as (2) but includes *29.
(6) same as (2) but includes *29%03 and /16(&*)',. In all equations
significant regional dummies (ECA, LAC and SSA) are taken into account as
in Table 3. The W-values are based on White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent
Standard Errors.
Consequently, we use +%,, #+  ., the lagged value for +%
(+%.) as well as the lagged value for the relative uncertainty
(+%.4+%) as instruments for +% and ,- in 2SLS
regressions. Table 5 presents the results. Again, FDI has no significant
effect on growth, but nor do any of the variables in a robust manner. The
28
use of instruments has given results that are generally weaker than those
found earlier, as is often the case with IV techniques. Furthermore, the
results confirm the sensitivity of parameter estimates to choice of
instruments. However, volatility of FDI has a consistently negative
effect on growth, it is usually weakly significant and the coefficient is
reasonably stable. The evidence for convergence among developing
countries is also reasonably consistent. These results are broadly
comparable to those of Lensink and Morrissey (2001); although the
significance of FDI increases, the inclusion of developed countries in the
sample does not alter the pattern of results.
The coefficients on instrumented ,- in Table 5 are much higher
than in Table 3 but only significant at the 10% level, probably because
the instrument regression is a poor fit. The decline in significance of the
coefficients on ,- suggests that it is not FDI volatility 	  that
retards growth, but that such volatility is itself a proxy for unobserved
factors that retard growth. In column 3 (Table 5), when +% (not
instrumented) is included, the striking effect is the increased size of the
coefficient on +%. This may simply be because the high correlation
between +% and +% persists even when we instrument for the
former; the broad pattern of results is unaffected. The results in columns
4 and 5 are more difficult to interpret, but seem to suggest that /  and
+- do not have an independent effect on growth other than their effect
here picked up by FDI and its volatility (when they are included as
instruments). The low explanatory power for column 6 reinforces the
earlier argument that the inclusion of the interactive introduces
excessive multicolinearity.
: 2!&
This paper contributes to the literature on FDI and economic growth in
developing countries by incorporating effects due to the volatility of FDI
inflows. Volatility was introduced into the model as affecting the
expected costs (returns) of innovation, and in this way is predicted to
have a negative effect on growth. We estimate a standard growth model
including FDI and volatility using cross-section, panel data and
instrumental variable techniques. Volatility of FDI is found to have a
consistent negative impact on growth, and this result is quite robust. The
pattern of results suggests that there appears to be convergence (or
slowing down of growth) among developing countries but neither human
capital nor FDI have contributed to growth. The principal factors we
identify as retarding growth in developing countries are the black market
premium (a measure of policy distortions) and the volatility of FDI. The
latter can be interpreted as a proxy for factors causing economic
instability. One possibility is that economies with high levels of
economic uncertainty tend to have lower and/or more variable growth
rates, and may also appear less attractive to foreign investors. One issue
to be pursued in future work is to examine the underlying reasons for the
volatility of FDI.
A general problem that plagues cross-country growth regressions is
potential endogeneity between growth and the variables of concern, in
our case FDI. We attempted to address this by instrumenting for FDI and
volatility, but the resolution is only partial. Future work can attempt to
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find better instruments for FDI, and especially volatility. A particular
problem with what we attempted here is that we were only able to
instrument for the ‘long-run’ as data on instruments was not available
for the panel sub-periods. One option for future work is to eschew
instruments in favour of using lagged values (on the basis that current
growth is not a determinant of past values of FDI and its volatility). In
order to do this while preserving degrees of freedom, we need to develop
the time series dimension of the data (the measure of volatility is the
major constraint here).
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BMP = the average black market premium (%) for the 1970-1997
period. Source:  Easterly and Yu (1999).
GFDI= the average gross foreign direct investment over GDP ratio over
1975-1997 period. Source: World Bank (1999).
GFDI1: lagged value for GFDI. As no data are available for GFDI
before 1975, we took first available observation.
GOV = The average value of government consumption as a percentage
of GDP for the 1970-1997 period. Source:  World Bank (1999).
GRO? the average real per capita growth rate over 1970-1998 period.
Calculated from real GDP 	
 data in constant dollars. Source:
Easterly and Yu (1999). Original source: Penn World Table 5.6
(Summers-Heston data).Missing data calculated from 1985 GDP per
capita and GDP per capita growth rates (Global Development Finance
& World Development Indicators).
LNAREA: a log value of area (the size of the country). Source: Easterly
and Yu (1999).
LNGDPPC1 = The logarithm of the 1970 value of real GDP per capita
in constant dollars (international prices, base year 1985). Source:
Easterly and Yu (1999). Original source: Penn World Table 5.6.
LNSEC1= log of The 1970 secondary school enrolment rate. Source:
Easterly and Yu (1999). Original source: Global Development
Finance & World Development Indicators.
UGFDI= “variability” or uncertainty in GFDI, measured by taking
standard deviation of errors of the equation GFDI= a1 GFDI(-1)+ a2
GFDI(-2) + a3 GFDI(-3)+ a4 TREND + C + e. This equation is
estimated for all countries over the 1975-1997 period.
UGFDI1: is the lagged value of UGFDI. Since data for GFDI are not
available before 1975, this is calculated by calculating the standard
deviation of the error terms of an regression of GFDI on a constant, a





The six aggregate governance indicators were kindly provided by Pablo
Zoido-Lobaton. See Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999) for an
extensive description. Governance is measured on a scale of about -2.5
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to 2.5 with higher values corresponding to better outcomes. The data are
based on data for 1997 and 1998. The variables are:
1) +-%% = An indicator of the ability of the government to
formulate and implement sound policies. It combines perceptions of
the quality of public service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy,
the competence of civil servants. the independence of the civil
service from political pressures, and the credibility of the
government’s commitment to policies into a single grouping.
2) +%, = This indicator measures perception of corruption: the
exercise of public power for private gain.
3) ## = Indicator which measures the extent to which agents have
confidence in and abide by the rules of society. These include
perceptions of the incidence of both violent and non-violent crime,
the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, and the
enforceability of contracts.
4)  , = This index combines indicators which measure perceptions
of the likelihood that the government in power will be destabilized or
overthrown by possibly unconstitutional and/ or violent means.
5) += An indicator of the ability of the government to
formulate and implement sound policies. It includes measures of the
incidence of market-unfriendly policies such as price controls or
inadequate bank supervision, as well as perceptions of the burdens
imposed by excessive regulation in areas such as foreign trade and
business development.
6) - = This index includes indicators which measure the extent to




The five legal system indicators are obtained from Easterly and Yu
(1999). They are zero-one dummies.
1) #+ = National legal system from British origin.
2) #+% = National legal system from French origin.
3) #++= National legal system from German origin.
4) #+ = National legal system from Scandinavian origin.
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7DEOH$&RUUHODWLRQ0DWUL[*RYHUQDQFH,QGLFDWRUV
GOVEFF GRAFT RULEL PINST REGBURD VOICE
GOVEFF 1.000
GRAFT 0.929 1.000
RULEL 0.890 0.877 1.000
PINST 0.794 0.750 0.877 1.000
REGBURD 0.761 0.684 0.744 0.682 1.000
VOICE 0.768 0.758 0.715 0.685 0.751 1.000
&RXQWULHVLQWKHVDPSOH
All countries for which FDI data are given in World Bank (1999).
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